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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 42576 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2014-2620 
v.     ) 
     ) 
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL, ) REVISED APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Edward Bursiel timely appealed from his judgment of conviction, and he now 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Mr. Bursiel 
further asserts that the district court erred by denying, in part, his motion for credit for 
time served. 
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 In 2014, over the course of three days, Edward Bursiel chatted online with a 
detective posing as a 14-year-old girl.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), p.3.)  The detective responded to a post in the “Personal and Casual Encounters” 
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section of Craigslist – a section requiring participants to affirm they are at least 18 years 
old – in which Mr. Bursiel indicated he was seeking sexual encounters with, “Any race, 
size, or age.  I don’t care.” (PSI, p.3; R, p.100.)1  Mr. Bursiel and the detective engaged 
in sexually explicit conversations and arranged to meet.  (PSI, p.3.)  During one of the 
conversations, Mr. Bursiel sent an explicit picture of male genitalia.  (PSI, p.3.)  Based 
on these facts, Mr. Bursiel was arrested and charged by information with one count of 
internet enticement and one count of misdemeanor disseminating material harmful to 
minors.  (R., pp.65-67.) 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Bursiel pled guilty to enticement, and the 
State dismissed the misdemeanor charge.  (Tr. 7/14/14, p.7, Ls.11-18, p.8, Ls.17-21; 
R., pp.139-148.)  The State also agreed to recommend a unified sentence of no more 
than 13 years, with three years fixed, and to recommend that the sentence be 
suspended.  (Tr. 7/14/14, p.6, Ls.8-11; R., pp.139-148.)  The defense was free to argue 
for less.  (Tr. 7/14/14, p.6, Ls.13-14; R., pp.139-148.)   
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor indicated the terms of the plea 
agreement were “five years fixed, five years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence 
of ten years.  That that be suspended.”  (Tr. 9/5/14, p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.2.)   
Mr. Bursiel’s counsel asked for a three-year term of probation.  (Tr. 9/5/14, p.20, Ls.99-
10.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Bursiel consistent with the State’s
                                            
1 This Court ordered the district court to prepare a Limited Clerk’s Record.  (See Order 
Granting Motion to Augment, entered April 5, 2016.)  The Limited Clerk’s Record 
contains documents that were filed in the district court after the original Clerk’s Record 
was created; however, the page numbers do not continue from that point but rather start 
over.  Therefore, citations to the original Clerk’s Record will include the designation 
“R.”, while citations to the Limited Clerk’s Record will include the designation “Lim. R.”   
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recommendation, but retained jurisdiction.  (Tr. 9/5/14, p.23, Ls.7-22; R., pp.159-163.)  
Mr. Bursiel filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (R., pp.167-170, 175-179.)  After a 
successful rider, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Bursiel on 
probation for three years.  (Lim. R., pp.37-56.)   
 In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bursiel argued the State breached the plea 
agreement by arguing for a unified term of 10 years, with five years fixed, rather than 
the agreed upon 13 years, with three years fixed.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-10.)  
Mr. Bursiel also argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-13.) 
 This Court granted the State’s motion to remand Mr. Bursiel’s case to the district 
court in order to determine the precise terms of the plea agreement – a motion that 
Mr. Bursiel did not oppose.  (See Order to Remand, entered January 14, 2016.)  On 
remand, the district court determined that the appropriate remedy under the 
circumstances would be to enter an amended judgment, nunc pro tunc, imposing a 
unified sentence of 13 years, with three years fixed, but also recognizing that Mr. Bursiel 
had already successfully completed his rider and had been placed on probation.  (Lim. 
R., pp.310-323; Tr. 2/25/16.)2   
 While Mr. Bursiel’s initial appeal was on-going, allegations that he violated the 
terms of his probation were being litigated in the district court.  Mr. Bursiel’s probation 
was initially transferred to the State of Washington and, on May 1, 2015, he was taken 
into custody by his Washington probation officer after failing a polygraph.  (Lim. 
                                            
2 In light of the district court’s decision on remand, Mr. Bursiel withdraws his claim that 
the prosecutor breached the terms of the plea agreement. 
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R., pp.60, 88-89.)  On June 26, 2015, the State filed a report alleging that Mr. Bursiel 
had violated the terms of his probation in multiple ways while he was in the State of 
Washington.  (Lim. R., pp.58-89.)  The district court entered an order to show cause and 
issued a bench warrant, and Mr. Bursiel’s custody was transferred from Washington 
officials to Idaho officials.  (Lim. R., pp.90-107.) 
 While his initial probation violation allegations were pending, Mr. Bursiel posted 
bond and he was released from custody.  (Lim. R., pp.118-126.)  Two-and-a-half 
months later, the State filed a new report of probation violation alleging Mr. Bursiel 
absconded and, a month after that, the State filed an additional probation violation 
allegation related to Mr. Bursiel being charged with a new crime in Washington State.  
(Lim. R., pp.151-207.)  After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court found 
that Mr. Bursiel violated the terms of his probation by committing a new crime in 
Washington State; by possessing password-protected electronic files; by engaging in 
sexual activity without the approval of his probation officer; by using a computer without 
the approval of his probation officer; and, by consuming alcohol; but found insufficient 
evidence to prove either that his son was a minor when he had contact with him or that 
he had absconded on the date alleged, and found another allegation to be too vague to 
provided adequate notice.  (Lim. R., pp.292-305; Tr. 2/2/16; Tr. 2/3/16.) 
 During the disposition hearing, the State requested that the court revoke 
probation, while counsel for Mr. Bursiel asked the court to continue him on probation 
and requested he be given 465 days of credit for time served.  (Tr. 3/11/16, p.6, Ls.9-
11; p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.1.)  The district court followed the recommendation of the State 
and revoked Mr. Bursiel’s probation, executing the previously imposed unified term of 
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13 years, with three years fixed.  (Lim. R., pp.361-362; Tr. 3/11/16, p.13, Ls.17-24.)  As 
to the question of the proper amount of credit for time served, the district court held off 
on making a ruling, giving the parties an opportunity to determine if they could come to 
an agreement on the proper amount of time.  (Tr. 3/11/16, p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.17.)  
Mr. Bursiel also filed a timely Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied.3  (Lim. 
R., pp.364-365, 374-386.) 
 The prosecutor entered a written motion arguing that Mr. Bursiel was entitled to 
353 days of credit for time served as of the date the district court orally pronounced it 
was revoking probation.  (Lim. R., pp.331-332.)  The prosecutor included the 30 days 
from July 8, 2015, when the prosecutor claimed Mr. Bursiel was served the bench 
warrant for the original probation violation allegations,4 to August 7, 2015, when he 
bonded out of jail.  (Lim. R., p.331.)  During a hearing (in which Mr. Bursiel was not 
present), counsel for Mr. Bursiel argued that Mr. Bursiel “was arrested for something on 
April 29, 201[5], and remained in custody until he bonded out on August 7,” and should 
get an additional 71 days of credit not calculated by the prosecutor for that time, 
although “a warrant wasn’t even issued on this case until that June 26 date.”  
(Tr. 3/31/16, p.22, L.23 – p.23, L.16.)  Counsel for Mr. Bursiel also argued that he 
should receive credit for 42 days he served between October 8, 2015, when he was 
arrested in Washington for the second time, until November 19, 2015, when he 
                                            
3 In light of the standards of review articulated in State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 
(2007), Mr. Bursiel does not raise the denial of his Rule 35 motion as an issue in this 
appeal. 
4 The warrant return of service shows the warrant was actually served on Mr. Bursiel on 
July 2, 2015.  (Lim. R., pp.97-99.)  It appears the prosecutor was relying upon an 
erroneous entry in the Register of Actions.  (Lim. R., p.331.) 
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transported back to Idaho, even though he was facing new charges in Washington at 
that time.  (Tr. 3/31/16, p.23, L.21 – p.25, L.12.) 
   The district court ruled from the bench that Mr. Bursiel was not entitled to the 71 
days prior to being arrested on the first bench warrant, but took the other issue under 
advisement.  (Tr. 3/31/16, p.25, L.13 – p.26, L.4.)  The district court entered a written 
order the following week denying Mr. Bursiel credit for the time he served in custody in 
Washington State from October 8, 2015, to November 19, 2015, wherein he was being 
held for his new criminal activity in Washington.5  (Lim. R., pp.393-395.)      
 Two and-a-half months later, Mr. Bursiel filed a pro se motion for credit for time 
served along with an affidavit which included a Jail Time Certification from the Benton 
County Washington Sheriff’s Office, demonstrating that he was incarcerated in the 
Benton County jail between May 1, 2015 and July 16, 2015.  (Augmentation, pp.1-6.)6  
Mr. Bursiel stated that he was being held solely on probation violations during that time 
period and he requested 77 days of credit for time served that the court had not 
previously granted.  (Augmentation, pp.3-6.)  Without making any factual findings or 
considering the merits of Mr. Bursiel’s claim, the district court denied the motion finding 
“the issue of credit for time served has already been decided.”  (Augmentation, pp.7-8.) 
  
                                            
5 Because the record in this case indicates that the second bench warrant was not 
served upon Mr. Bursiel until November 20, 2015, he does not challenge the district 
court court’s denial of these 42 days of credit for time served.  (See R., pp.244-245.)   
6 Simultaneously with this brief, Mr. Bursiel filed a motion to augment the record with the 




1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked probation and executed 
Mr. Bursiel’s sentence? 
 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Probation And Executed 
Mr. Bursiel’s Sentence 
 
Mr. Bursiel asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion by revoking his probation and executing his unified 13-year sentence, with 
three years fixed.  When a probationer has admitted to violating the terms of probation, 
the decision on the proper disposition is left to the sound discretion of the district court.  
The governing objectives in determining the appropriate punishment for criminal 
behavior are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing.  
Edward Bursiel is a Marine Corps veteran, who served from 1986 to 1994 when 
he was honorably discharged.  (PSI, p.9.)  He also has a strong work history and has 
been self-employed since 1998 performing landscaping and sprinkler maintenance in 
the summer, and doing dry walling and odd jobs in the winter months.  (PSI, p.10.)   
Mr. Bursiel was remorseful, and expressed his regret regarding his conduct.  
(See, e.g., PSI, pp.3-4, 12-13.)  During his original sentencing hearing, Mr. Bursiel told 
the district court: 
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Your Honor, I’m sorry for my behavior and I’m here to accept responsibility 
for my actions.  I’m just kind of nervous now – and what I did was 
inappropriate and wrong and I’m ashamed of myself.   
. . .  
And like I said, I’m really truly sorry and this -- this is a one time thing and I 
wasn’t thinkin’ in my right mind when I did it and I assure you nothing like 
this is gonna happen -- happen in the future.  And I just want to thank you 
for your consideration and that’s basically all I have to say.  
 
(Tr. 9/5/14, p.20, L.21 – p.22, L.3.)  Mr. Bursiel knew he had done something wrong and 
wanted to take responsibility for his wrongful conduct by pleading guilty to the offense.  
(Tr. 11/8/13, p.7, Ls.8-18; PSI, pp.12-13.)  Additionally, Mr. Bursiel apologized for his 
actions during the disposition hearing, stating that he had a lot of time to reflect on his 
actions while he was in jail, and noting that, if the court were to place him back on 
probation, he would be able to stay at the State Motel, which is Department of 
Correction approved housing with a 6 p.m. work week curfew, and is locked down on 
weekends. (Tr. 3/11/16, p.10, L.4 – p.11, L.12.) 
Idaho Courts recognize that military service, a strong work history, and remorse 
for one’s conduct, are all mitigating factors that should be considered by the district 
court when that court determines the appropriate punishment. See State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89 (1982); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 
204 (Ct. App. 1991).  Mr. Bursiel asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation and executing his sentence, in light of the mitigating factors that 




The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bursiel 68 Days Of Credit For Time Served7 
 
 “A motion to correct a court's computation of credit for time served, granted 
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603, may be made at any time.” I.C.R. 
35(c).  Idaho Code § 19-2603 states that a defendant is entitled to any credit for time 
served in custody following an arrest made pursuant to Idaho Code § 20-227.  I.C. § 19-
2603.  Idaho Code § 20-227 authorizes a probation officer to arrest a probationer 
believed to have violated the terms of probation, without the need to first obtain a bench 
warrant.  I.C. § 20-227. 
 Along with his pro se motion for credit for time served, Mr. Bursiel provided his 
own affidavit and a Jail Time Certification from the Benton County Washington Sheriff’s 
Office, demonstrating that he was incarcerated in the Benton County jail between 
May 1, 2015 and July 16, 2015.  (Augmentation, pp.3-6.)  Mr. Bursiel swore that he was 
being held solely on probation violations during that time period and he requested credit 
for time served accordingly.  (Augmentation, pp.3-6.)  Mr. Bursiel’s factual assertions 
are supported by the record in this case.   
The prosecutor filed the initial probation violation allegation based upon reports 
generated by Mr. Bursiel’s Washington State probation officer who stated that 
                                            
7 Although Mr. Bursiel’s trial counsel asked for 71 days of credit for time served during 
the post-disposition hearing, and Mr. Bursiel asked for 77 days of credit for the time 
period between May 1, 2015, and July 16, 2015, in his pro se motion, the record reflects 
the district court granted Mr. Bursiel’s credit from the time the prosecutor mistakenly 
claimed the bench warrant was served on July 8, 2015.  Therefore, at issue in this 
appeal is whether Mr. Bursiel should be granted credit for the 68 days he spent in 
custody in Washington from the time he was arrested on May 1, 2015, through July 7, 
2015.    
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Mr. Bursiel was taken into custody on May 1, 2015, and he remained in the Benton 
County Washington jail until he was transferred to Bonner County Idaho jail on July 16, 
2015.  (Lim. R., pp.58-104.)  While a bench warrant was not served upon Mr. Bursiel 
until July 2, 2015 (see Lim. R., pp.97-99), the record demonstrates unequivocally that 
he was being held under a written statement made by his Washington State probation 
officer, which served as the functional equivalent of an agent’s warrant, solely on the 
basis of his probation violations from May 1, 2015, until July 16, 2015 (Lim. R., pp.58-
107).  See I.C. § 20-227.  Mr. Bursiel’s Washington State probation officer filed three 
separate reports, each of which indicate that he was “in custody” at the time the reports 
were generated.  (Lim. R., pp.65-89 (see specifically pp.66, 82, 89 (box in upper left 
corner checked “in custody.”))) 
The district court initially denied Mr. Bursiel credit for the time he served in 
Washington State between May 1, 2015 and July 7, 2015, based upon the erroneous 
belief that he was not entitled to credit for time served until the bench warrant was 
served upon him which the court apparently believed was on July 8, 2015.  (See Lim. 
R., pp.331-332 (prosecutor’s calculation of credit for time served); see also Tr. 3/31/16, 
p.26, Ls.13-19 (“[H]e will not get those 71 days.  He – there’s no bench warrant; there 
was no probation violation filed.  So the fact that he got arrested on something in 
Spokane and was in custody, he is not entitled to credit for time served until this Court 
issued a warrant and we served him with it.”))  In denying Mr. Bursiel’s pro se motion for 
credit for time served, the district court merely stated “the issue of credit for time served 
has already been decided,” and the court apparently did not consider either the 
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evidence Mr. Bursiel provided or the evidence already available in the court’s file, and 
the court did not apply the relevant law.  (Augmentation, pp.7-8.)   
 The credit for time served that Mr. Bursiel requested is mandatory (see 
I.C. §§ 19-2603; 20-227), and the district court erred in denying Mr. Bursiel credit for the 
68 days he served in jail between May 1, 2015, and July 7, 2015. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bursiel respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court with instructions to place him back on probation or to otherwise reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate.  Additionally, Mr. Bursiel respectfully requests that 
this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions that Mr. Bursiel be 
granted an additional 68 days of credit for time served. 
 DATED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JASON C. PINTLER 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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